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Operational Security and     
Cyber Security 
The Effect of Human Error                         
on Modern Security Breaches 
By Devin C. Streeter 
The United States is entering into an era 
characterized by technological innovation 
and increased networking and connectivity. 
This new norm has opened up new 
vulnerabilities in the realm of cyber security. 
These weaknesses, however, are 
increasingly typified by human error and a 
failure of operational security (OPSEC) that 
costs the United States and the world 
massive amounts of financial capital. These 
errors are typified by a lack of information on 
security policies, a failure of safe use of 
social media, misuse of company computers, 
and repeated use of weak passwords. 
Potential solutions should be developed with 
minimal third party intervention and with a 
focus on informing personnel on internet 
security. 
Operational security has been a concern of 
U.S. military operations since the 
Revolutionary War.1 George Washington 
personally noted that small details of 
information must be hidden in order to run an 
efficient military apparatus.2 However, with 
increases in technology, the exploitation risk 
of private materials grows.3 With every new 
technology, from telegrams, to radios, to 
                                                          
1 LTC Robert G. Michnowicz, “OPSEC in the 
Information Age,” Strategy Research Project, March 8, 
2006, 2, accessed October 21, 2013, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/k
sil427.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 NSA, “Purple Dragon: The Origin and Development 
of the United States OPSEC Program,” United States 
Cryptologic History, Series VI Volume 2, August 22, 
2007, accessed October 21, 2013, 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_quar
terly/purple_dragon.pdf. 
4 Ibid. 
5 DSS, “Targeting U.S. Technologies, a Trend Analysis 
of Cleared Industry Reporting,” October 1, 2013, 
accessed October 21, 2013, 
http://www.dss.mil/documents/ci/2013%20Unclass%2
0Targeting%20US%20Technologies_FINAL.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
telephones and the Internet, the 
convenience of information sharing has 
opened up fresh weaknesses in the U.S. 
security and intelligence community.4 
The United States has seen an 
escalation of cyber assaults on its military, 
defense, and technological infrastructures.5 
Reports show that criminals, foreign 
governments, and private entities have 
heavily targeted these public and private 
sectors.6 Studies show that approximately 
28,765 breaches have been reported in the 
United States in 2013,7 with 64% (18,410) of 
breaches occurring in the business sector, 
14% (4,027) of successful attacks occurring 
against the United States government, with 
the final 12% (3,452) targeting educational 
centers and 10% (2,877) focusing on the 
medical industry.8 
The costs of these attacks are 
staggering, bleeding the United States 
approximately $5,403,644 annually and the 
world around $28,814,844 U.S. dollars per 
year.9 When the costs of scams, sabotage, 
and damages from these attacks are 
included, the costs become exponential, to 
the point of costing 1% of the United States 
GDP.10 This is a transnational and extremely 
damaging reality.  
The impacts of cyber espionage are 
grim and devastating in both the private and 
public sectors.11 However, the root of all 
cyber breaches stems from the compromise 
7 Ponemon Institute, “2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: 
Global Analysis,” Semantic White Paper, May 2013, 
accessed October 23, 2013, 
https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/053
013_GL_NA_WP_Ponemon-2013-Cost-of-a-Data-
Breach-Report_daiNA_cta72382.pdf. 
8 Rapid 7 Corporate Headquarters, “Data Breaches in 
the Government Sector,” May 31, 2012, accessed 
October 23, 2013, http://www.rapid7.com/docs/data-
breach-report.pdf. 
9 “2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis.” 
10 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The 
Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber 
Espionage,” McAfee Security Report, July 2013, 3. 
accessed October 23, 2013, 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-
economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf. 
11 “Data Breaches in the Government Sector.” 
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of sensitive information.12 The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies writes:  
The most important area for loss is in 
the theft of intellectual property and 
business confidential information—
economic espionage.13  
Similarly, the government has experienced a 
record increase of attacks targeting 
“personally identifiable information” in 18 of 
24 major federal agencies.14 This information 
can be used to steal funds, access classified 
information, and complete acts of cyber-
espionage.15   
The United States General 
Accounting Office summarizes the size and 
scope of the cyber threat thusly:  
Computers are crucial to the 
operations of government and 
business… [but] many computer 
systems and networks were not 
designed with security in mind… As a 
result our critical infrastructure is 
riddled with vulnerabilities that could 
enable an attacker to disrupt 
operations or cause damage.16 
The reality is that cyber security is a very 
vulnerable part of both public and private 
sectors. If not properly protected, the cyber 
realm offers a vulnerability that can be very 
easily exploited with minimal effort and 
consequences on the part of the attacker.17 
However, there is a much more easily 
exploited side to cyber security that has been 
                                                          
12 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The 
Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber 
Espionage,” McAfee Security Report, 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Data Breaches in the Government Sector.” 
15 United States General Accounting Office, 
“Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection,” United States General 
Accounting Office Report, May 2004, 1, accessed 
October 26, 2013, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf. 
16 Ibid, 26. 
17 Ibid. 
18 IT Governance, “Boardroom Cyber Watch Survey,” 
IT Governance 2013 Report, 8, accessed October 26, 
2013, http://www.itgovernance.co.uk/download/Cyber-
Watch-Survey-Report-FINAL.pdf. 
largely unseen in the greater conversation 
over securing cyberspace: the element of 
human error and traditional espionage.18 
Human error in cyber security manifests itself 
in various levels of threat: (1) lack of 
information on security policies, (2) a failure 
of safe use of social media, (3) misuse of 
company computers, and (4) repeated use of 
weak passwords.19 These errors come to 
fruition through poor OPSEC and failures in 
screening procedures. 
Human error is a major contributing 
factor to cyber breaches. Sources show that 
human error accounts for 35% - 53.5% of 
cyber breaches caused by preventable 
employee error20 or sabotage from within a 
company in both the public and private 
sectors.21 Simultaneously, the Phenomenon 
Institute noted that of the 72% of cyber 
breaches, 35%22 can be directly traced to 
individual failure while 37%23 can be boiled 
down to acts by “criminal insiders 
(employees, contractors or other third 
parties)”.24 These trends are verified by the 
Defense Security Service (DSS), which 
noted a staggering 458% increase in the 
targeting of overseas, U.S.-cleared 
personnel for information,25 and a further 
43% increase of those seeking employment 
for the purpose of illicit information 
acquisition.26 Simply put, humans can be the 
weakest link in cyber security.27 As one 
professional cyber consultant succinctly 
states: “Amateurs hack systems, 
professionals hack people.”28  
19 Kenneth Geers, “Strategic Cyber Security,” NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, 
2011, 40, accessed October 26, 2013, 
https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/Strategic_Cyber
_Security_K_Geers.PDF.  
20 “2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis.” 
21 “Boardroom Cyber Watch Survey,” 8. 
22 “2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis.” 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 “Targeting U.S. Technologies, a Trend Analysis of 
Cleared Industry Reporting.” 
26 Ibid. 
27 The Economist Special Report, “The Weakest Link,” 
The Economist, October 24, 2002, accessed October 
27, 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/1389553.  
28 Ibid. 
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Of these types of breaches, the poor 
handling of sensitive information on the 
internet arises from a misconception of 
OPSEC.29 Research Specialist LTC 
Michnowicz properly articulates the problem 
with OPSEC procedures in saying: 
Current OPSEC policy and 
regulations appear outdated and in 
need of revision in order to 
successfully deny US adversaries the 
ability to gain information… computer 
technology and communication 
advances require a renewed internal 
effort by the United States 
government to curtail vulnerability in 
the critical areas of unclassified open 
source communication networks.30 
Social media, the Internet, and the increased 
connectivity of modern life have transformed 
cyber space into an OPSEC nightmare.31  
The reality is that many individuals 
will not commit cyber espionage personally, 
but almost all of them will use social media 
and some facet of the internet for 
communication.32 These sites are prime 
areas for potential cyber criminals to watch 
for posts on work, policy, and family life.33 
This information is then a primary target of 
hackers, identity thieves, and foreign 
intelligence agents.34 This is a widely 
acknowledged and serious problem in both 
the public and private sectors.35  
                                                          
29 Michnowicz, 1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Geers, 107. 
32 US Army, “OPSEC and Safe Social Networking,” US 
Army Briefing Packet, October 2013, accessed 
October 27, 2013, http://www.lewis-
mcchord.army.mil/des/OPSEC%20Training/Socialme
diaandOPSECbrief1.pdf.  
33 Operations Security Professionals Association, 
“Operations Security,” OSPA Briefing Packet, October 
2009, accessed October 28, 2013,  
http://www.opsecprofessionals.org/training/OPSEC_T
raining.pdf.  
34 “OPSEC and Safe Social Networking.” 
35 United States Department of Defense, “Operations 
Security (OPSEC),” Department of the Army, April 19, 
2007, accessed October 28, 2013,  
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar530-1.pdf.  
It is worth noting that the government 
sector sets out strict regulations on how to 
handle the internet and network safely.36 
Army regulation specifies that military 
personnel must: 
Consult with their immediate 
supervisor and their OPSEC Officer 
for an OPSEC review prior to 
publishing or posting information in a 
public forum. This includes, but is not 
limited to letters, resumes, articles for 
publication, electronic mail (e-mail), 
Web site postings, web log (blog) 
postings, discussion in Internet 
information forums, discussion in 
Internet message boards or other 
forms of dissemination or 
documentation.37 
Many private sector groups have similar 
stipulations.38 However, both the Department 
of Defense (DOD)39 and private sector40 
acknowledge that security procedures are 
not adhered to and that there is a general 
lack of common sense when it comes to 
internet and technology use.41 Both public 
and private sector indicate a deficit of 
“knowledge about their security strategy”42 
and that many groups lack a cohesive plan 
for protecting their information.43  
Part of the problem lies in simple 
posts on social media, blogs, and websites 
that can be used for nefarious purposes.44 
The Al Qaeda handbook specifically notes 
that social media can reveal “Government 
36 “OPSEC and Safe Social Networking.” 
37 “Operations Security (OPSEC).” 
38 David Sims, “Survey Finds Manufacturers Afflicted 
with a False Sense of Cybersecurity,” Industry Market 
Trends, October 2, 2013, accessed October 29, 2013,  
http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2013/10/02/ survey-
finds-manufacturers-afflicted-with-a-false-sense-of-
cyber-security/.  
39 US Army Public Affairs, “Army Operations Security: 
Soldier Blogging Unchanged,” US Department of the 
Army, May 2, 2007, accessed October 29, 2013,  
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ army/blog050207.pdf.  
40 Sims. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “Targeting U.S. Technologies, a Trend Analysis of 
Cleared Industry Reporting,” 53. 
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personnel and all matters related to them 
(residence, work place, times of leaving and 
returning, children and places visited).”45 
Electronic capabilities such as geotagging, 
facial recognition, and global positioning 
systems (GPS) can also easily reveal 
locations, activities, and coworkers.46 Simple 
things such as privacy settings,47 user 
license agreements,48 and use of plug-ins,49 
can all contribute to a cyber breach if not 
properly addressed.50 
Similarly, use of computers in 
downloading unauthorized materials that can 
contain spyware, malware, Trojan Horses, 
and other hacking tools of the trade is a 
serious problem.51 Those who download files 
without confirming their origin run the risk of 
crashing their system.52 This is a grave 
problem in both public and private sector, 
and has been the cause of multiple cyber 
breaches.53 
Yet another easily preventable error 
in cyber security is reuse of weak 
passwords.54 A study released by the U.S. 
Computer Emergency Readiness Council 
shows that 89% of web users feel that they 
use safe password habits.55 However, the 
same study notes that 61% of internet users 
reuse passwords on multiple accounts, 54% 
have only 5 passwords or less, 44% change 
their passwords less than once a year, and 
                                                          
45 “OPSEC and Safe Social Networking.” 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 “Operations Security.” 
51 Geers, 42. 
52 Thomas J. Harvey, “Battling Employee Sabotage in 
the Wired Workplace,” The Center for Association 
Leadership, November 2001, accessed 30 October 
2013,  
http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/whitepaperdeta
il.cfm?ItemNumber=12167.  
53 “Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection,” 24. 
54 Alexa Huth, Michael Orlando, and Linda Pesante, 
“Password Security, Protection,  
and Management,” U.S. Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team, December 2012, accessed October 
30, 2013, http://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/PasswordMgmt2012.pdf.  
21% of those polled have had an account 
compromised.56 These statistics fly in the 
face of safe internet practices.57 
Simultaneously, those who reuse passwords 
are more likely to use passwords that are 
easy to guess and are more likely to reveal 
them to others.58 This kind of sloppy OPSEC 
can result in increased susceptibility to 
phishing.59 Phishing, the creation of a false 
webpage to capture username and 
password, is a very easy and often used 
tactic.60 However, weak password security 
can make a minor inconvenience a 
catastrophic security breach, giving the 
attacker access to multiple accounts and a 
wealth of secure information.61 
All of these factors are of the utmost 
concern when it comes to OPSEC practices 
and cyber security. As noted before, many of 
these issues are addressed in security 
protocols.62 However, there is a steep divide 
between what institutions teach and what 
their employees practice.63 This problem 
exists despite the weight of evidence and 
existing barriers; therefore a different focus is 
key to rectify the damages of poor OPSEC.64 
However, this reform is best carried 
out within the existing system and limiting 
third party involvement.65 Involving third 
parties, even those with proper clearance, 
55 CSID, “Consumer Survey: Password Habits, A Study 
of Password Habits Among American Consumers,” 
CSID White Paper, September 2012, 3, accessed 
October 30, 2013, http://www.csid.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/CS_PasswordSurvey_FullR
eport_FINAL.pdf.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Huth, Orlando, and Pesante. 
58 “Consumer Survey: Password Habits, A Study of 
Password Habits Among American Consumers,” 3. 
59 “Dinei Florencio and Cormac Herley, “A Large-Scale 
Study of Web Password Habits,” Microsoft Research, 
2007, 8, accessed October 30, 2013,  
https://research.microsoft.com/pubs/74164/www2007.
pdf.  
60 “Consumer Survey: Password Habits, A Study of 
Password Habits Among American Consumers,” 2. 
61 Ibid. 
62 “OPSEC and Safe Social Networking.” 
63 Michnowicz, 1. 
64 Ibid. 
65 “2013 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis.” 
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can greatly increase costs,66 increase the 
risks of further breaches,67 and expand the 
leaking of further sensitive information.68 
However, the GAO highly recommends that 
if a third party must be involved, that these 
companies have cleared personnel, a good 
reputation in the defense community,69 and 
under no circumstances should a company 
from a foreign country be included, even if 
they are allies of the United States.70 Third 
parties should be avoided when looking for 
an OPSEC solution, but if they are used they 
must be from within the United States.71 
That being said, the bulk of evidence 
agrees that a successful OPSEC program 
has been established by the United States.72 
However, the strict enforcement and 
adaptability of this policy can easily be called 
into question.73 Training and enforcement of 
safe OPSEC is far from ideal due to the fact 
that it implicitly relies on the “entrusted 
soldier to practice OPSEC.”74 Serious 
personal mistakes will always be a problem 
with both the military and the private sector. 
However, with increased focus on the threat 
posed by poor OPSEC in the cyber realm, a 
greater sense of responsibility may be 
instilled in employees.75 The only solution to 
this particular brand of threat is in constant 
reemphasis on dangers posed by poor cyber 
OPSEC.76 
However, some authors recommend 
updating OPSEC protocols in both private 
and public sector to better enforce cyber 
security.77 The reality is that while OPSEC 
has been fiercely defended in the past, 21st 
century threats require greater adaptation 
with an emphasis on evolving technology.78  
In essence, personnel will remain the 
weak link in United States cyber defenses. 
The evolution of modern warfare has opened 
                                                          
66 Ibid. 
67 “Operations Security (OPSEC),” 36. 
68 “Targeting U.S. Technologies, a Trend Analysis of 
Cleared Industry Reporting.” 
69 “Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection,” 181. 
70 “Targeting U.S. Technologies, a Trend Analysis of 
Cleared Industry Reporting.” 
71 Ibid. 
new weaknesses in U.S. infrastructure and 
industry, but the reality is that traditional 
espionage will remain a serious threat even 
in an age characterized by cyber attacks. 
Human error and OPSEC will remain of the 
utmost concern, as failure on these fronts will 
cost millions more dollars in damages and 
incalculable compromising of classified 
information. These errors are typified by a 
lack of information on security policies, a 
failure of safe use of social media, misuse of 
company computers, and repeat use of weak 
passwords. Potential solutions will avoid 
third parties and will reemphasize the 
ultimate danger of an individual’s poor cyber 
practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Michnowicz, 6. 
73 Ibid, 8. 
74 “Army Operations Security: Soldier Blogging 
Unchanged.” 
75 “Operations Security.” 
76 Ibid. 
77 Michnowicz, 1. 
78 Ibid. 
